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Jevons's Applications of Utilitarian
Theory to Economic Policy*
SANDRA J. PEART

College of William and Mary

I

,

The precise nature ofW. S. Jevons's utilitarianism as a guiding rule for
economic policy has yet to be investigated, and that will be the first
issue treated in this paper. While J. A. Schumpeter, for instance,
asserted that 'some of the most prominent exponents of marginal
utility' (including Jevons), were 'convinced utilitarians', he did not
investigate the further implications for Jevons's policy analysis. 1
Moreover, Jevons's writings on economic policy are strikingly
similar to those of J. S. Mill, yet mostly overlooked. I shall demonstrate
the remarkable degree of common ground between_Jevons and Mill on
policy issues, a matter formally recognized, as I shall show, by Jevons
himself. ;rt emerges that Jevons's policy writings, like those of Mill,
must be understood in the context of a wide-ranging programme for
social reform. Jevons and Mill shared an intense desire to correct
perceived social and economic injustices, as well as a common method
of weighing predicted benefits and costs in the light of their overall
goal of social reform. These goals largely coincided. For both, the
primary welfare problem was what Jevons termed the 'deep and almost
hopeless poverty in the mass of people', a problem which was to be
• I would like to thank Professors S. Hollander of the University of Toronto, and Craig
Heinicke at the College of William and Mary, members of the History of Economic
Thought Workshop at the University of Toronto, participants in the History of Economics Society 1989 annual meetings, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments at
earlier stages of this research, as well as the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada for financial support.
1;
1
History of Economic Analysis, New York, 1954, p. 1056; cf. p. 408. R. D. C. Black has
noted that Jevons's utilitarianism has been neglected. He argues that while the greatest
happiness principle-a 'social principle'-was not important to the Theory of Political
Economy (henceforth TPE), the 'principle of utility', or theory of pleasure and pain, was
integral to that work. Cf. 'Jevons, Bentham and DeMorgan', Economica, xxxix (1972),
125--7, and 'William Stanley Jevons', The New Palgrave,-ed. J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and
P. Newman, 3 vols., London, 1987, ii. 1012-13. J. Spengler argues, without elaboration,
that Jevons's examination of the role of the state evinced empiricism and utilitarianism.
See 'The Marginal Revolution and Concern with Economic Growth', History of Political
Economy, iv (1972), 480-1. But in 'Jevons and his Precursors', Econometrica, xix (1951),
233-4, R. Robertson suggested that the TPE provides evidence that Jevons 'subtly
rejected' Benthamite utilitarianism. In T. W. Hutchison's discussion of Jevons on policy,
there is no mention of utilitarianism (On Revolutions and ProgPess in Economic
Knowledge (henceforth On Revo{utions), Cambridge, 1978, pp. 96-102).
©Oxford University Press 1990
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corrected by a variety of policies designed to encourage self-improvement on the part of labourers. 'Improvement' encompassed the achievement of intellectual, moral and economic independence; intervention
was justified if it forwarded this goal providing always that the
(expected) costs of intervention did not outweigh the (expected) benefits of improvement.
My examination controverts the recent evaluation by T. W. Hutchison, who has argued that 'around 1870' there occurred 'a major
turning-point in economic policy' linked to Jevons's theoretical
innovations in economics. It is 'surely not entirely coincidental' (runs
this evaluation) that the policy revolution occurred in Britain where
'central Ricardo-Mill theories of value and distribution' were being
challenged by 1870. More specifically, it is the rejection of the natural
-wage theory that Hutchison claims 'opened up the whole question of
poverty and social reform', while 'the utiiity concept and the principle
of diminishing marginal utility ... fostered ideas about redistribution
and progressive taxation in England'. 2 An emerging concern with
unemployment is also linked to the theoretical developments.
Hutchison argues further that a new 'cautious' and 'empiricist'
policy stance and methodology emerged 'somewhere about 1870' (pp.
94, 95). Here he poi:i;its to the abandonment of the 'sweeping application
of laissez-faire principles', with Jevons envisaged as 'if not a "revolutionary", at least a transitional figure', who appreciated that the issue
of intervention must be decided on a case-by-case basis, by 'empirical
examination' (pp. 96, 97). 3 In short,
It is for its magnificently eloquent, often-quoted statements of an empirical,
experimental anti-apriori approach to policy questions that Jevons's The State
in Relation to Labour is famous. Jevons indeed is a forerunner of Sir Karl
Popper both in his conception of scientific method in his Principles of Science
and consequently also in his advocacy of empirical, piecemeal social experimentation (p. 101).

The implication of this claim is that Jevons's approach to policy was
fundamentally different from that of his predecessors, Jevons being
' On Revolutions, pp. 62, 97, 92--3. M. Blaug has argued that there was continuity
between neoclassical and classical economic policy analysis, marginal utility theory
being 'largely irrelevant' to economic policy. See 'Was There a Marginal Revolution?',
History of Political Economy, iv (1972), 269, 279. I agree that there was continuity; but, as
far as concerns Jevons and Mill, this must be explained in terms of a common
interpretation of the utilitarian principle.
3
Elsewhere Hutchison writes that Jevons was 'fundamentally and philosophically'
anti-dogmatic, having abandoned his early 'thoroughgoing free-market view' ('The
Politics and Philosophy in Jevons's Political Economy', Manchester School, 1 (1982), 376).
Jevons's policy analysis itself is said to have undergone a transition between 1857 and
1882. This matter I take up below. E. Paul also concludes that Jevons abandoned laissez.
faire doctrine, but recognizes that he was close to Mill methodologically. See 'Jevons:
Economic Revolutionary, Political Utilitarian', Journal of the History of Ideas, xl (1979),
278.
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more realistically attuned than they to the needs of his country and the
abilities of policy makers. In his 'later years' he is said to have
possessed a realistic insight into the nature of economic knowledge and of its
application to the problems of economic policy-making which has not been
equalled by any other comparable group of economists, and was certainly far
superior to that of [his] Ricardian predecessors with their comparisons with
Newton, Euclid and the law of physics (p. 120; see also The Politics and
Philosophy of Economics, New York, 1981, p. 39).

While Mill's article, 'Leslie on the Land Question' (1870), was, he
allows, characterized by 'less rigid, Ricardian, deductive absolutism',
Hutchison asserts that this 'relativism does not otherwise figure at all
strongly or prominently elsewhere in the Principles or in the essay on
Definition and Method' (p. 63). 4
Vin~ent Bladen in his account of the period also points to a decline
of the laissez-faire doctrine and increased 'realism' of professional
economists by 1870. Economists from Adam Smith to J. S. Mill are said
to have been 'so impressed with the possibility of the automatic
functioning of the economic system that they preached the doctrine of
laissez-faire' reducing 'the agenda of government ... to a minimum';
whereas there is discernible a 'collectivist trend in legislation' in the
writings of professional economists by 1870-including, conspicuously,
Jevons. 5 In this account, throughout the late nineteenth century
economists gained a new and realistic appreciation of the ·complexities
of the economic system, a responsible attitude towards policy analysis,
and a 'diminished faith in a priori reasoning':
Economists became more careful in applying theory, valid under certain
postulated conditions of great simplicity, to the problems of the real world, and
more sensitive to those changes in the characteristics of the real world which
undermined views of public policy which had been well founded in the
conditions of an earlier time (p. 309; cf. pp. 303--8).

The increased calls for intervention, it is asserted, reflected altered
economic conditions rather than developments in economic theory (p.
306).
As remarked" earlier, it is my contention that Jevons and Mill shared
a common method as well as a common set of value-judgements
defining 'the greatest good'. Both saw a role for intervention, but one.
• This position Hutchison subsequently modified by a concession that Mill's methodological shift occurred in the last eight years of his life (rather than the five years posited
in his book), and that relativism does not figure very (instead of 'at all') strongly ('On
JSM's,Defence ofRicardian Economics', Open Letter to S. Hollander, Birmingham, 1981,
p. 3).
• An Introduction to Political Economy, Toronto, 1959, pp. 302, 303. Black, too, suggests
that there was a trend in social and economic policy making 'from a more individualistic
to a more collectivist approach ... with public opinion coming to question the established Victorian values of self-help and independence' ('Transitions in Political Economy', Manchester Special Lectures (unpublished typescript), 1982, pp. 7, 13).
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which took account of individual initiative, and aimed at encouraging
'self-reliance'. For both, utilitarianism entailed a presumption in
favour of encouraging independent and responsible behaviour, and
liberty constituted a key element in the utilitarian goal. 6
The paper proceeds as follows. I outline first Jevons's conception of
utilitarianism, and proceed in section III to the~application of utilitarian rules to policy analysis. Section IV focuses specifically on his
analysis of trade unions and co-operation, where his vision of a
reformed society peopled by self-reliant labourers is most striking. The
extraordinary similarity between Mill and Jevons methodologically, in
the choice of policy goals, and in the analysis of specified policy issues
is demonstrated in section V. Jevons's intellectual debt to Mill is
investigated in section VI. Finally, I turn to the implication of my
analysis concerning the relationship between theory and policy, as
well as the purported policy break of 1870.

II
It is an essential feature of Jevons's utilitarian perspective that

policy was not to be based on a theory of 'abstract rights'. In 1867 he
offered this 'strong opinion':
no abstract principle, and no absolute rule, can guide us in determining what
kinds of industrial enterprise the State should undertake, and what it should
not.... Nothing but experience and argument from experience can in most
cases determine whether the community will be best served by its collective
state action, or by trusting to private self-interest (Methods of Social Reform
and Other Papers, London, 1883, p. 278). 7

Jevons reiterated this argument in 'Experimental Legislation' (MSR,
1880, p. 275) and in 1882, when again he denied the existence of
'abstract rights, absolute principles, indefeasible laws, inalterable
rules, or anything whatever of an eternal and inflexible nature' in
social affairs (The State in Relation to Labour, (henceforth SRL),
London, 1887, p. 6; cf. pp. 16, 9).
Further, from at least 1871, Jevons's approach to legislation was
cautious, and appreciative of the fact that policy must take public
opinion into account: 'The Government cannot always engage to teach
people what is best for them, and ... we must pay some attention to the
6
I agree with Hutchison's evaluation concerning Jevons's method, and policy goals.
But I add to his analysis by demonstrating Jevons's utilitarianism and its near identity
with that of Mill. Jevons emerges from my examination as more conservative and less
willing to call for intervention than J. S. Mill. This supports Hutchison's argument that
Jevons was 'cautious', but refutes his position that it was Jevons who ended the
'sweeping' adherence to laissez-faire.
7
For convenience, references to works published in Methods of Social Reform (MSR),
Investigations in Currency and Finance (!CF), as well as The Principles of Economics
(PE), are referred to by the volume in which the piece was published (MSR, !CF, or PE),
followed by the original date of publication.
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most unreasoning prejudices' (The Principles of Economics and Other
Papers, London, 1905, p. 223). Five years later he suggested that
'Compromise is of the very essence oflegislative change, and as society
becomes more diverse and complicated, compromise becomes more and
more indispensable' (MSR, 1876, p. 24 7). And in 1880 he stressed the
limitations which popular opinion placed on policy matters, so that
while parliament might 'to a certain extent, guide, or at any rate
restrain, the conduct of its subjects', its 'powers' were 'very limited'
and 'a law which does not command the consent of the body of the
people must soon be repealed ... ' (MSR, 1880, p. 261; cf. SRL, p. 20).
In 1880 Jevons warned against (untested) wide-ranging legislative
reform, this indeed being the 'main point' of 'Experimental Legislation'
(MSR, p. 275). Whenever possible, legislators 'should observe the order
of nature, and proceed tentatively' since major legislative interventions might entail 'catastrophic' disturbances of the orderly process of
'social growth':
Changes effected by any important Act of Parliament are like earthquakes and
cataclysms, which disturb the continuous course of social growth. They effect
revolutionary rather than habitual changes. Sometimes they do much good;
sometimes much harm; but in any case it is hardly possible to forecast the
result of a considerable catastrophic change in the social organism (p. 256).

In short, Parliament 'must give up the pretension that it can enact
the creation of certain social institutions to be carried on as specified
in the "hereinafter contained" clauses', being at any rate 'almost
powerless' to create institutions (p. 261). Since the imposition of a
'sudden general' law was costly while affording 'no clear means of
distinguishing its effects from the general resultant of social and
industrial progress' (pp. 264-5), Jevons recommended that legislation
be gradual and partial. 8
In sum, legislation was 'not a science at all' but rather a matter of
'practical work, creating human institutions', akin to the craft of
shipbuilding (SRL, pp. 7, 9). Sciences founded upon 'general principles
of nature', such as ethics, economics, and jurisprudence, 'assist in the
work of legislation' just as physical sciences 'instruct us in the making
of a ship'. Jevons ascribed a complex synthesizing task to the legislator, involving 'use of any science, or of all sciences which have any
bearing upon the matter' (p.,28). Legislation was to be approached in an
'all-round manner', the legislator being
neither chemist, nor physicist, nor physician, nor economist, nor moralist, but
all these things in some degree, and something more as well, in the sense that
he must gather to a focus the complex calculus of probabilities, the data of
which are supplied by the separate investigations (p. 29).
8

Elsewhere Jevons argued that fenced machinery might 'palpably' prevent industrial
accidents; yet the observed outcome was complicated by possible altered behaviour
patterns, a moral hazard problem (SRL, p. 27).

Sandra J. Peart

286

'The greatest good of the greatest number' was the criterion for
evaluating these probabilities. Against his caution, Jevons balanced a
reformist attitude: 'no sociaLtransformation would be too great to be
commended and attempted', provided that 'it could be clearly shown to
lead to the greater happiness of the community', that is assuming
'scientific evidence of [its] practicability and good tendency' (SRL, p.
11). Thus
the State is justified in passing any law, or even in doing any single act which
without ulterior consequences, adds to the sum total of happiness. Good done
is sufficient justification of any act, in the absence of evidence that ·equal or
greater evil will subsequently follow (p. 12).

The evaluation of any act of government entailed a judgment
concerning 'the balance of good or evil which it produces'; this of
course constituting the 'outcome of the Benthamist doctrine' (p. 17).
Interpersonal and intertemporal weighing of the net balance was
required: 'It is not sufficient to show by direct experiment or other
incontestable evidence that an addition of happiness is made. We must
also assure ourselves that there is no equivalent or greater subtraction
of hai;>piness,-a subtraction which may take effect either as regards
other people or subsequent times' (p. 28). While he recognized that a
policy such as a tax on matches would impose hardship upon labourers
in the industry as a result of a fall in demand for their product, Jevons
stressed the short run nature of this hardship, and concluded that 'It is
the law of nature and the law of society that the few must yield to the
good of the many' (a reference to those citizens outside the industry
who benefit from the imposition of a sound tax), 'provided that there is
a clear and very considerable balance of advantage to the whole
community' (PE, 1871, p. 221). 9
In principle, no group or person was to receive special trel:!,tment in
the comparisons of 'happiness': the Factory Acts received high praise
for being 'disinterested legislation' treating of 'the health and welfare
of the people at large' (p. 52; cf. p. 53). Taxation, also, was to impinge
equally upon citizens.
But what, precisely, did the notion of 'happiness' entail? Jevons
suggested in the Theory of Political Economy that prices might be used
to measure 'utility' (p. 12), but recognized the narrow focus entailed by
this procedure:
~

It is the lowest rank of feelings which we here treat. The calculus of utility ,
aims at supplying the ordinary wants of man at the least cost of labour.... A
higher calculus of moral right and wrong would be needed to show how he may
It is a defect of his argument, that Jevons did not raise the issue of compensation. To
my knowledge the only mention of compensation occurs in A Serious Fall (1863), where
he argued that since the government never decreed gold as a 'real standard of value', it
was not obliged to compensate those who lost following an inflation (!CF, pp. 94-5).
9
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best employ that wealth for the good of others as well as himself. But when that
higher calculus gives no prohibition, we need the lower calculus to gain us the
utmost good in matters of moral indifference (p. 27).

Insistence upon a broad perspective emerges when Jevons turned to
policy as such. In The State in Relation to Labour he suggested that
policy makers who sought general happiness must consider not only
'economic' but also 'moral', 'sanitary' and 'political' probabilities (p.
30). Thus, the evaluation of policy measures involved more than a
simple-minded observation of prices. 10
In a review of Utilitarianism published in 1879 Jevons conceded
Mill's case that pleasures ranged from 'high' to 'low'. Yet he argued in
opposition to Mill, that pleasures might be ranked 'high' or 'low'
according to Benthamite measures of their 'length, intensity, certainty, fruitfulness, purity and extent' (to large numbers ofpeople). 11 A
comparison of policies would then reveal which contributed most to
.overall happiness. Thus 'after the model of inquiry given by Bentham,
[we may] resolve into its elements the effect of one action and the other
upon the happiness of the community'.
But two problems remained. Even if all persons are treated the same
in this comparison (and there is reason to doubt that Jevons actually
adhered to this precept), it is by no means clear how to rank any two
policies until a means of measuring 'intensity', 'fruitfulness', etc. for
each person affected by the policy has been devised, and then a
weighting scheme has been designed and justified for total pleasure,
the (weighted) sum of each type of pleasure (summed across all
individuals). Each (expected) outcome entailed some quantities of
qualitatively different pleasures; Jevons implicitly regarded some
qualities (such as length) as more important than others (such as
intensity). Policies that might be expected to promote these more
worthwhile types of pleasures, were, in his estimation, better than
policies which did not. Thus he suggested, for instance, that the
construction of a library, entailing lasting pleasure, results in 'a higher
pleasure' than the establishment of a race course that creates intense,
short-lived pleasure (p. 533). In short, Jevons's utilitarianism was
intimately bound up with subjective judgments concerning the general
10

Jevons insisted in TPE that interpersonal comparisons of utility were unnecessary
for his theory (p. 14). In policy analysis, comparisons were called for, although Jevons
now enlarged the notion of 'utility' to encompass much more than 'the lowest ran~ of
feeling'. He never came up with a quantitative means to measure this 'utility'.
11
See 'John Stuart Mill's Philosophy Tested. iv. Utilitarianism', Contemporary Review, iv (1879), 533. It is my position that Jevons's differences from Mill concerning the
procedures.for ranking pleasures were important from a philosophical standpoint, but
did not create any marked difference in policy analysis. In practice, notwithstanding the
key differences on the ranking of pleasures, the policy analysis and recommendations of
Mill were similar to those of Jevons. This I account for in terms of their shared goal of
wide-ranging social reform.
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development of society and the amelioration of working class conditions.12
Presumably because of this concern with the labouring classes,
Jevons's writings reveal further that in fact some groups of people were
weighted more heavily in the utilitarian estimate of 'happiness' than
others. As I argue below, his utilitarianism must be understood in the
context of a wide-ranging programme for social reform, designed with
special reference to .the labouring poor.
It is a second inadequacy of Jevons's procedure that he provided no
mechanism to estimate consumers' pleasures when prices are not
allowed as indicators of happiness. And this measurement is certainly
called for, if interpersonal trade offs of happiness are"l"equired. If there
is no mechanism-such as prices-for making interpersonal comparisons of utility, it is not clear how the policy maker was to maximize
general happiness. 13 Given this inadequacy, it is not surprising that in
1882 Jevons fully acknowledged estimates of 'utility' might differ: 'We
cannot expect to agree in utilitarian estimates, at least without much
debate. We must agree to differ, and though we are bound to argue
fearlessly; it should be with the consciousness that there is room for
wide and bona fide difference of opinion' (SRL, p. 166).
While Jevons insisted that utilitarian policy could rely upon no
,universal rules, he did allow a number of presumptive guidelines. 14 In
the absence of an explicit pleasure ranking system, we can infer
something about Jevons's conception of the broad utilitarian aim from
his policy recommendations.
It emerges from these recommendations that utilitarianism for
Jevons involved first and foremost the alleviation of poverty, including
its consequences, 'vice' and 'ignorance'. In the 1865 Coal Question he
referred to 'the poverty', and 'ignorance, improvidence, and brutish
drunkenness of our lower working classes' which he linked to rapid
population growth in the face of stagnating demand for agricultural
labour, and which was to be corrected by a system of general education
(The Coal Question: An Inquiry Concerning the Progress of the Nation
and the Probable Exhaustion of our Coal Mines, London, 1906, pp.
As L. Stephen has demonstrated, this is the case also for J. S. Mill, for whom
utilitarianism attempts to address the issue of 'development', altering the 'elements of
happiness itself' (The English Utilitarians, 3 vols., London, 1900, iii. 308; cf. pp. 304f and
note 35 below).
13
This point is reiterated by Paul, p. 283.
14
Compare L. Robbins, who criticized Jevons for suggesting that there are no general
criteria for intervention: 'the net effect of his discussion, is certainly to leave the
impression that all questions of practice are completely open questions, and that there
are no rules of any degree of generality which social science, combined with the
Utilitarian norms, may enable us to devise' (The Evolution of-Modern Economic Theory,
London, 1970, p. 187).
12
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xlvii-xlviii). His 1870 Opening Address to the British Association for
the Advancement of Science decried the results of over-population,
'the deep and almost hopeless poverty in the mass of people', and
advocated policies which would enable the labourer to become selfsufficient (MSR, 1870, pp. 196, 197). 15 In 1878 Jevons called for wide-ranging social reform to eliminate poverty: 'If the citadel of poverty
and ignorance and vice is to be taken at all, it must be besieged from
every point of the compass-from below, from above, from within; and
no kind of aim must be neglected which will tend to secure the ultimate
victory of morality and culture' (MSR, 1878, p. 2).
Since 'happiness mainly consists in unimpeded and successful energ~sing', liberty constituted a second major component of Jevons's
utilitarian goal, being envisaged as both a basic requisite to happiness,
and means to achieving it-that is, 'a prime element in happiness', and
also 'the necessary condition of that free development from which all
our social blessings arise' (SRL, p. 5). Each 'needless check or limitation of action' was thus considered as 'so much destruction of
pleasurable energy, or chance of such' (p. 13).
At the same time man is a social being, and consequently 'cannot
enjoy the society of other men without constantly coming into conflict
with them'; the 'mere fact of society existing obliges us to admit the
necessity of laws, not designed, indeed, to limit the freedom of any one
person, except so far as this limitation tends on the whole to the
greater average freedom of all' (p. 14). Here interpersonal trade offs
were the norm; yet since liberty ranked highly as a pleasure, Jevons
was inclined to argue that 'a heavy burden of proof' was required in
order to show that a liberty-reducing intervention was warranted.
Although there is 'on the whole, a certain considerable probability
that individuals will find out for themselves the best paths in life, and
will be eventually the best citizens when left at liberty to their own
course' (MSR, 1882, p. 176), if evidence reveals exceptional cases to the
cont'°ary, intervention is justified. While 'more general considerations
lead us to look upon freedom as the normal state', Jevons suggested
that the question of interference must be decided with reference to
'time, place, history, and national character' (SRL, p. 33).
Individual interests were in all cases to be balanced against the
general good, a consideration which in 1876 is said to require 'the
nicest discrimination' 'to show what the Government should do, and
what it should leave to individuals to do' (PE, 1876, p. 206). Although
For further evidence of Jevons's concern with poverty and the link with over·
population, as well as his,.. policy recommendations to alleviate these problems, see S.
Peart, 'The Population Mechanism in W. S. Jevons's Applied Economics', Manchester
School, lviii (1990), 46-9. 'The Rationale of Free Public Libraries' reveals a continuing
interest in the alleviation of poverty (MSR, 1880).
15
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he was always willing to concede the exceptional case to the contrary,
Jevons retained a presumption in favour of private provision of
services throughout his career. 16 In 1867 his 'strong opinion' was that
while the public provision of some services, yields 'most indisputable
advantages', 'private commercial enterprise and responsibility have
still more unquestionable advantages' (MSR; p. ·278). In 1875 he argued
that 'free trade and free competition both of employers and workmen is
the true thing' (Papers and Correspondence of William Stanley Jevons,
ed. R. D. Collison Black, 7 vols., London, 1972-81, "'vi. 79). Four years
later he reiterated that the 'presumption is always against a State
department', although 'in any particular kind of work there may be
special conditions which render the unity and.. monopoly of Government control desirable and profitable' (MSR, 1879, p. 338). He
suggested in 1882 that 'the present social arrangements have the
considerable presumption in their favour that they can at least exist,
and they can be tolerated' (SRL, p. 12). Thus a 'heavy burden of proof'
was placed upon the 'advocate of social change which has not or
cannot be tested previously on a small scale'. And, as we will see below,
the specific reforms that Jevons advocated placed emphasis upon
private provision, as well as local control, of the proposed services.

III
,Jevons's major works on economic policy, The State in Relation to
Labour, and Methods of Social' Reform, reveal his concern with ameliorating working class conditions. "Throughout we find evidence of a
wide-ranging reform programme designed to encourage self-improvement on the part of the labouring classes.
The presumption in favour of liberty is evident throughout Jevons's
analysis of trade unions. Here he argued that 'anything ... which tends
to interfere with the exercise by any person of the utmost amount 'Of
skill of which he is capable, is prima facie opposed to the interests of
the community' (SRL, p. 99); but he conceded that there may be
'counterbalancing advantages', in which case the trade union might be
sanctioned, provided it be 'fully justified and carefully regulated by the
State' to ensure that its 'raison d'etre must be the good of the people
outside, not of the privileged few inside the monopoly'. Failing this, it
should 'be either reformed or destroyed'.
The State might also justifiably restrict· liberty when 'the expert is a
16
Compare Paul, who has argued that Jevons's exhortations concerning laissez-faire
amounted to 'empty and formalistic obeisance', whose effect was 'rendered nugatory' (p.
278; cf. p. 283), and also that Jevons was less individualistic than Mill and stripped
Utilitarianism of a 'presumption in favor of liberty' (pp. 279--80).
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far better judge than the individual purchaser', and 'ignorant people
cannot take precautions against dangers of which they are ignorant', a
case described in 1882:
While it is a fact that people live in badly-drained houses, drink sewage water,
purchase bad meat or adulterated groceries, it is of no use urging that their
interests would lead them not to do so. The fact demolishes any amount of
presumption and argument (pp. 42-3).
More strongly, such action is said actually to give effect to people's
desires, and thereby to ensure the existence ofliberty: the 'Government
officer who steps in and prevents the faulty article from being exposed
to sale does not really restrict the liberty of the purchaser ... [but]·
actually assists the purchaser in carrying out his own desires' (p, 43).
On similar grounds Jevons recommended that mothers of young
children be restricted from working in factories, a policy which is said
to ensure that the interests and liberty of children were protected
(MSR, 1882, pp. 156-79).
Jevons praised the 1834 Poor Law for its emphasis on local control of
poor law policy, and called for the creation of 'a strong executive
commission framed somewhat on the lines of the Poor Law Commission' to authorize and supervise plans 'proposed by local authorities' in
the Liquor Trade; successful plans would 'by degrees' be adopted in
other locales (MSR, 1880, p. 271). This method is said to have been used
in 'all the more successful legislative and administrative reforms of
later years' (p. 266), including incremental steps towards regulating
factory hours. The issue was 'not to be decided once for all on some
supposed principle of liberty', because 'where a large number of men
are employed together in a factory there is not the same,individual
liberty' (SRL, p. 65). The 1878 Factory Act thus received praise for 'the
several more tentative acts by which this was preceded' as well as 'the
thorough inquiries of the Factory Act Commissioners of 1875' (p. 52).
But Jevons supplemented this endorsement of incrementalism (and
careful inquiry), and recommended experimental legislation in the
punishment of debtors, sanitary regulations, and the London Water
Supply (MSR, 1S80, pp. 265, 273f). 17
In Jevons's treatment of taxation we find evidence of his desire to
make a (synthetical) utilitarian estimate of the benefits and costs of
specific taxes in order to impose 'theoretically' sound taxes (PE, 1871,
p. 211). The 1875 lecture on taxation outlined 'four ["classical"]
maxims of taxation which Adam Smith laid down as the qualities
In W. Mays' evaluation: 'Whenever possible, Jevons believes, legislation should
observe the order of nature and proceed tentatively', a type of experimentation which
resembles 'that involved in habit· learning'. See 'Jevons's Conception of Scientific
Method', Manchester School, xxx (1962), 243.
17
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proper in a tax' (Papers and Correspondence, vi. 135). 18 The first,
proportionate taxation, was said to be 'a doubtful proposition theoretically' requiring examination 'from many sides'. Since proportionate
taxation 'only bears a very small real proportion to [the rich man's]
total income compared with the proportion which the poor man's
taxation bears to his', it imposed relatively more suffering on the poor
than the rich and was not 'fair' .19
Jevons raised several objections, however, to progressive taxation.
He argued, first, that if the poor were exempt from taxation a situation
would result where 99% of the population taxed the 100th% (p. 136). 20
Secondly, relatively high tax rates on the rich were said to create
adverse incentive effects for capital accumulation with a negative
impact on the rate of 'progress'. On balance Smith's proportionate
scheme was most reasonable. Most interesting and subtle, exemption
and proportionate taxation were regarded as means of inculcating
responsibility among citizens. No class other than those who were
'actually paupers' was to be exempt from taxation, and taxation was to
be 'coincident with representation':
We must carefully guard against imposing upon the very poor any charge
disproportionate to their income, and from those who are actually paupers we
cannot really take anything. But if representation is to be coincident with
taxation, then taxation must be coincident with representation. We may strive
privately to alleviate the extreme differences between the incomes of the poor
and the rich, but to allow any exemption from the duties and responsibilities of
citizenship would be a concession ultimately fatal to the welfare of all (PE,
1871, p. 239).

Jevons evaluated a broad range of policies in the light of their
perceived abilities to improve the 'general low tone' of the labouring
classes. The notion that education was of paramount importance to the
economic and intellectual independence of the working classes, and a
necessary preliminary to resolution of problems associated with overpopulation, prompted him to call for its public provision. 21
Once the 'education question was put in a way of fair solution',
Jevons enlarged his vision of education to entail a remarkably broad
18

These are equality, certainty, convenience, and economy. While Jevons's debt to
Smith is here formally acknowledged, he was clearly working within the same frame·
work as Mill. See Principles of Political Economy, ed. J.M. Robson, 2 vols., Toronto, 1965
(Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vols. ii and iii), iii. 805.
19
The argument relied upon diminishing marginal utility of income: 'The general idea
... was that 10 [pounds) was of more importance to a man whose income was only 100 a
year than 100 would be to a man whose income is 1,000; and of vastly more importance
than 1;000 would be to a man whose income was 10,000 a year'.
20
Exemption, however, is really a separate logical issue.
21
See Jevons's remarks of 3 Nov. 1866: 'I hope to see every child educated, and every
exception to the equality of classes before the laws of justice removed' (Papers and
Correspondence of William Stanley Jevons, iii. 138). For further evidence, see Peart, pp.
46f.
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programme of cultural activity (MSR, 1878, p. 26). Since the 'vulgarity'
of the working classes was due in part to the suppression of amusements 'by a dominant aristocracy', improvement of 'the low state of
musical education' was a means to 'a higher civilization' (pp. 6, 7, 11).
He recommended the provision of outdoor concerts by volunteer and
unpaid musicians, it being the duty of the upper classes to frequent the
concerts in order to spread their popularity (pp. 13, 24). This would
result in an 'enormous increase of utility ... acquired for the community at a trifling cost' (pp. 28-9); minimal state interference, and
local variation, were involved. Public libraries, also, were recommended as a low-cost means of broadening the education of the
working classes, provided they entailed local direction and a minimum
of government agency (1881, pp. 28-52). And Jevons objected to large
public museums on the grounds that they were an ineffective educative
tool; he regarded local collections of geological artefacts as more
effective (1881-2, pp. 55-6, 62).

IV
M. White has argued that Jevons's work on labour issues was designed
to support the status quo. The evidence given below relating to the
analyses of trade unions and co-operation reinforces the notion that
Jevons favoured incremental social change. 22
Confining the analysis within a partial-equilibrium setting, Jevons
argued in 1868 and 1882 that labour supply restrictions within particular trades resulted in artificially high wages and prices in the affected
industries: 'Each trade which maintains a strict union' endeavours 'to
secure an unfair share of the public expenditures' (SRL, p. 106; cf.
MSR, 1868, pp. 111-12). This 'private taxation' was said to be borne by
consumers, who were, for the ~ost part, labourers (pp. 104, 106). 23
Further, since those 'who most need combination to better their
fortunes are just those who are the least able to carry it out', unions
exacerbated distributive injustices. Jevons concluded
Though workmen, in respect of belonging to the same social class, may try to
persuade themselves that their interests are identical, this is not really the
case. They are and must be competitors, and every rise of wages which one
body secures by more exclusive combination represents a certain amount,
sometimes a large amount, of injury to the other bodies of workmen ... success
22
-On this matter see M. White, 'The Restoration of "Supply and Demand": The
Production of Jevons's Theory of Political Economy', Paper presented at the 11th
Conference of Economists, Flinders University of South Australia (1982), p. 37, and
Black, 'Jevons' in The New Palgrave, ii. 1013.
23 Labour supply restrictions in the building trades were 'particularly injurious', since
'The general effect is to make really wholesome houses a luxury for the wealthier classes,
while the residuum have to herd together between whatever walls they can find' (SRL,
pp. 104-5).
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in maintaining exclusive monopolies leads to great loss and injury to the
community in general (p. 104).

Trade unions also created technical inefficiencies, since workers
resisted the introduction of cost-reducing innovations (MSR, 1870,
p. 126). 24
Notwithstanding his disapproval of restrictive union attempts to
raise wages, Jevons allowed in 1868 that trade unions performed an
educative function: 'some kind of association' being 'indispensable to
the progress and amelioration of the largest and in some respects the
most important class of our population', and 'one of the best proofs of
the innate capacity for self-government which I believe we all possess'
(MSR, 1868, pp. 102, 103; cf. MSR, 1870, p. 123). Unions"Were also said to
enable the labourer to guard his 'health, convenience, comfort, and
safety' (p. 108).
Because trade unionism encouraged self-reliant behaviour, and
since experience revealed that legislation to restrict trade union
activity would 'suppress with much evil many germs of good', Jevons
recommended in 1882 that the legislature 'finally' relinquish 'its
jealousy of associative action' (SRL, pp. 109, 114-15). 25 He insisted,
however, that the 'imperative needs' of society be met, and favoured
the establishment of an authority to ensure that 'in the last resort'
duties such as the stoking of gas retorts be performed in the event of a
strike. Finally, Jevons favoured voluntary union membership.
But all this was second best. As a solution to the labour problem
Jevons preferred 'one more useful and beneficial form of organisation',
which he referred to interchangeably as co-operation and partnership
(MSR, 1870, pp. 122-3), an arrangement whereby labourers would
contribute 'on a small scale' to the 'sinking fund', and receive their
usual wage payments as well as some share of profits. (Profits in this
context are treated as a return to investment, plus a residual which
varies from year to year depending on the realized output price.)26
In 1866 Jevons wrote an impassioned plea to the Manchester City
News:
I hope to see the time when workmen will be to a great extent their own
capitalists.... I believe that a movement of workmen towards co-operation in
the raising of capital would be anticipated by employers admitting their men to
a considerable share of their profits (Papers and Correspondence, iii. 138).
24
On only two occasions did Jevons look at the general case, and he concluded that
general wage increases were unattainable. See MSR (1868), pp. 113-14, and SRL, p. 106.
25
This was a reluctant endorsement. Jevons insisted throughout his career that all
labourers (including unions) should recognize that their interests were aligned with
producers, and never endorsed union attempts to raise wages.
26
There are problems reconciling the formulation with Jevons's TPE. See H. Stewart,
'Jevons on Profit-Sharing: Atomistic Theory. versus Social Policy', Paper presented to
the HES annual meetings, Charlottesville, 1989.
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Co-operation, which divided the produce of labour 'as it has always
been re~ogriized by political economists-the wages of labour, the
interest of capital, the wages of superintendence, the compensation for
risk in the sinking fund, and the extra profits of successful years', is
said to implement 'the great vivifying principle of political economythat reward should be in proportion to desert'. 27 Its advantages are said
to include the increased 'diligence' of workers as a result of their
interest in the enterprise, a decline of discontent among the labourers
who share in the enterprise's concerns, increased savings of labourers,
fewer strikes and the decline of the notion that incomes should be
equal (ibid., 153). In 1870, Jevons reiterated that partnership would
'efface in some degree the line which now divides employers and
employed' (MSR, 1870, p. 148). Again he anticipated increased efficiency since workers would gain a 'direct interest in the work done'.
There would also be a role for competition, an 'honourable rivalry'
among firms (p. 142).
Most importantly, partnership would correct the 'one great defect of
character' of the working class- 'the want of thrift and providence'
(pp. 144, 145). Labourers who received a lump sum bonus in yearly
dividends would begin 'to look beyond the week' and become independent; thus co-operation would stimulate self-reliant behaviour and
'millions may be ultimately raised above the chance of pauperism' (pp.
146, 148). 'It is only in becoming small capitalists', Jevons wrote, 'that
the working-classes will acquire the real independence from misfortune, which is their true and legitimate rule' (p. 146). 28
•
In 1882 Jevons specified his notion of partnership more fully. Here he
described a system involving payment of'subsistence' weekly wages 'to
enable the labourer and his family to await the completion of the
interval between manufacture and sale', and in addition, a 'share of all
surplus profits' (SRL, pp. 142, 143). 29 Again he stressed that this
arrangement would reduce industrial strife (p. 145).
It is significant that there is little distinction between partnership
and co-operation in Jevons's 1866 work; and apparently in consequence of perceived· wealth constraints precluding workers from gathering the requisite capital together, from 1870 ,he favoured industrial
partnership which in 1875 he defined as the 'truest form of cooperation' (Papers and Correspondence, vi. 77; cf. iii. 153; MSR, 1870, p.
27

Letter to The Times, 19 Jan. 1867, Papers and Correspondence, iii. 152. This is the
justification of'all the laws of property, and ... their only sufficient warrant' (p. 152; cf. p.
132).
28
Partnership would lead to 'peace', 'steady, zealous work', mutual 'confidence and
esteem', and less 'drunkenness', 'fighting', 'swearing', and 'gambling' (p. 130).
29
Jevons also considered the alternatives of conciliation and arbitration here and
argued in favour of arbitration for settlement of past disputes, and conciliation for
disputes concerning the 'future rate of wages' (SRL, pp. 145, 152).
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141). He did not proceed as far in this matter as Mill, who distinguished
carefully between partnership and co-operation, and preferred the
latter.
With the foregoing in mind we can turn to White's evaluation that
despite his criticism of the wage-fund theory, Jevons arrived at its
'most doctrinaire' conclusions reinforcing 'iron laws' of income distribution. This interpretation is unconvincing, though Jevons did maintain that the achievement of a general wage increase through union
activity was not feasible. Apart from his recognition that union
activity could alter the distribution of income across trades by altering
the structure of wages, there is the fundamentally important role
accorded partnership and co-operation, which, by enabling labourers
to become ('small') capitalists, could most certainly alter the distribution of income, and allow labourers to become self-reliant. Modification of existing institutions constituted a powerful means of social
reform.

v
In his Essay on method Mill stressed, as Jevons was later to do, that the
policy analyst must synthesize the scientific knowledge of many
disciplines:
He must analyze the existing state of society into its elements, not dropping
and losing any of them by the way. After referring to the experience of
individual man to learn the law of each of these elements ... and how much of
the effect follows from so much of the cause when not counteracted by any
other cause, there remains an operation of synthesis; to put all the effects
together ... to collect what would be the effect of all the causes acting at once
(CW, iv. 336). 30

Since these operations are 'performed only with a certain approximation to correctness', the synthesis is tentative: 'mankind can never
predict with absolute certainty, but only with a less or greater degree
of probability'.
Mill argued that legislation was not itself a science, although it
relied upon a number of scientific endeavours: 'Legislation is making
laws. We do not talk ofthe science of making anything' (p. 321). In the
'art' of legislation, he insisted that rules and exceptions were normal,
there being no universally valid policy prescriptions: 'If, in the majority of cases ["a certain thing"] is fit to be done, that is made the rule.
When a case subsequently occurs in which the thing ought not to be
done, an entirely new leaf is turned over' (p. 339). In this respect,
Jevons's method was entirely at one with Mill's.
30 All references in the text to Mill's work are from the Collected Works of John Stuart
Mill, ed. J.M. Robson, Toronto, vols. i-v, x, xiv, xviii and xix; they include CW, j;he
volume number, and page.
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'Practical' and experiential knowledge-'extensive personal experience' -was, for MiU, indispensable to the legislator (p. 333). In the
1851 'London Water SuJ?ply', he reiterated that the imposition of any
particular policy involved 'matters of fact' and not 'principle' (CW, v.
437). Further, he fully appreciated the difficulties which Jevons later
stressed, of designing experiments and interpreting evidence, and he
cautioned against wide-ranging inference based upon observation.
Thus the experience of one country could not be applied to another in a
simple-minded fashion, and legislators could not infer that institutions
which suited English 'opinions, feelings, and historical antecedents',
suited Ireland (CW, vi. 511-12; cf. iv. 328-9). 31 Because of the problems
associated with multiple causation, observations required careful
interpretation (CW, iv. 328-9; ii. 145).
Notwithstanding these difficulties, Mill wrote enthusiastically about
experimental attempts to evaluate the relative merits of various forms
of social organization, and argued in Principles of Political Economy
that these experiments should be actively 'encouraged': 'Every [1848:
Socialism, Communism, every] theory of social improvement, the
worth of which is capable of being brought to an experimental test,
should be permitted, and even encouraged, to submit itself to that test'
(CW, iii. 903). The passages on European Associations in the 1852
edition provide further evidence of this appreciation of 'noble' social
experiments (cf. pp. 769-91; 903-4). 32 The Chapters on Socialism also
called for trials on an 'experimental scale' (CW, v. 736). In this
appreciation of experiential method, we have seen, Mill anticipated
Jevons.
For Mill, the unifying principle of public policy was, of course, the
greatest good of the greatest number, but he was much concerned with
the precise nature of the general rule. After his self-described emotional crisis, he reformulated the goal, rejecting what he originally
(mistakenly) perceived to be Bentham's excessively narrow definition
(cf. CW, i. 99-100). 33 Because he stressed man's spiritual nature, he
argued that material gain was not the ultimate goal for society. A
moral tone, and a wide notion of 'improvement', were therefore integrated into the utilitarian goal; 'utility', he maintained, constitutes
Jevons criticized Mill's calls for 'a vast revolution in the land-owning of Ireland',
and favoured a 'small progressive experiment' instead-a position which supports my
contention that Jevons was prone to be less interventionist than Mill (sse note 6 above).
In 1882 Jevons favoured the Irish Land Act; see SRL, p. 8.
32
See the remarks from Essays on Economics and Society, ed. J.M. Robson, 2 vols.,
Toronto, 1967 (CW, vols. iv and v), v. 618: 'Since trial alone can decide whether any
particular experiment is successful, latitude should be given for carrying <' l the
experiment until the trial is complete.'
33
For a full discussion of Mill's vacillations regarding utility, see S. Hollander, The
Economics of John Stuart Mill, Oxford, 1985, pp. 602f. The author demonstrates that
Mill's utilitarian position, according a prominent role to individual liberty, was in fact
consistent with Bentham's original position.
31
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'the ultimate source of moral obligations' (CW, x. 226). This perspective
had major implications for economic policy, which at the least, Mill
argued, was to suit, and at best might improve, the moral character of
the public. Thus Mill occasionally questioned the effectiveness of
institutional reforms which did not aim at moral improvement and
would consequently not achieve lasting effects. 34
The greatest-happiness notion remained nonetheless problematic,
since Mill was never able to provide a clear cut means of ranking, or
evaluating, pleasures. In Utilitarianism, he resorted to 'competent
judges' who were to perform the difficult task of 'valuing' the quality of
pleasures (CW, x. 213; cf. pp. 211-12). 35 Just as Jevons allowed that we
'might not agree on our utilitarian estimates', so, also, Mill realized
that even competent judges might not agree on the ranking.
Since for Mill as well as Jevons the moral, economic and intellectual
independence of each, is integral to 'happiness', he placed conspicuous
emphasis on 'liberty' as a component in the utilitarian goal. This is a
carefully specified liberty pertaining to 'self-regarding' actions, and is
regarded as a human need, requisite to attaining happiness: 'Where,
not the person's own character, but the traditions or customs of other
people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the principal
ingredients of human happinessi and quite the chief ingredient of
individual and social progress.' 36 Mill stressed that specific reforms
should be encouraged but not imposed, and preferred local to central
control of reforms on the grounds that this preserved liberty; his praise
for the Poor Law ran along precisely these lines. 37 In these respects, he
was at one with Jevons.
On Llberty provides the methodological framework for approaching
specific economic policies. In instances of 'social acts', there was no
doubt that intervention, affecting 'that part of conduct which society is
competent to restrain', was admissible (CW, xviii. 293; cf. iii. 803-4).
Each instance required examination to determine whether intervention was warranted; if unimpeded action led to undesirable results, this
behaviour could be restricted. Mill argued that laws preventing fraud,
34
See Mill, The Later Letters 1849-1873, ed. F. E. Mineka and D. N. Lindley, Toronto, 4
vols., Toronto, 1972 (CW, vols. xiv-xvii), xiv. 45, and Essays on Economics, CW, iv. 375.
35
The moralist like Mill who attempts to allow for (and encourage) human improve·
ment, may not accept that pleasures which attract more people are those which should be
ranked most highly. Consequently Mill sought an alternative means of ranking pleasures. See Stephen, iii. 304f. This problem also plagued Jevons.
"' Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. by J.M. Robson, Toronto, 2 vols., 1977
(CW, vols. xviii and xix), xviii. 261. See the discussion in J.M. Robson:' ... Mill argues
that social ends cannot be understood, much less achieved, except by individuals'; the
individual 'must be free to choose his own destiny in the light of his moral viewsconsideration always being given to the happiness and equal development of others' (The
Improvement of Mankind, Toronto, 1968, p. 127; cf. pp. 124--7).
37
Essays on Ethics, CW, xix. 606---7. Thus for example, State-funded education should
be available to all, but not compulsory. See The Later Letters, CW, xiv. 89.
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and sanitary and safety regulations, were justified on this basis (pp.
292-3; cf. x. 197-8). Trade itself was a 'social act' falling 'within the
jurisdiction of society'. If free trade did not ensure cheap and good
quality products, intervention was required. Jevons's position on this
justification for intervention was fully anticipated by Mill.
Mill argued for intervention in cases where forces distorted competition (as in, for example, the Endowments question) (CW, v. 625; cf. 433,
vi. 502). Monopoly rights granted by the State should also be regulated-a justification which we have seen Jevons relied upon in his
analysis of the trade union. In the face of a conflict of interests in
society, there might be further scope for intervention. Most important
is the provision of educational services, Mill arguing that, since the
interests of parents clashed potentially with those of children, intervention was justified-an argument which Jevons extended to restrictive legislation regarding working mothers.
Mill also urged the public provision of special services, which would
not be 'adequately' supplied by competitive forces:· 'anything which it
is desirable should be done for the general interests of mankind or of
future generations', 'but which is not of a nature to remunerate
individuals or associations for undertaking it' being deemed 'a suitable
thing to be undertaken by the government' (CW, iii. 970). Jevons also,
we have seen, urged the provision of public services (such as libraries)
based upon a similar justification.
In the general conception of the utilitarian goal, Mill anticipated
Jevons. But what of Mill's analysis of trade unions? Since Jevons was
highly critical of the wage-fund and inverse wage-profit theories, one
might expect their positions on trade unions to differ. In fact, they do
'not, and this requires explanation.
In Thornton on Labour and Its Claims (1869), Mill referred to 'a view
of the question of wage increases', reportedly a 'common opinion' that
wage increases might be financed by increased prices (CW, v. 660).
While acknowledging that 'in single trades' a wage increase would be
followed by an increased price, Mill insisted, following Ricardian
principles, that an across-the-board increase would leave the level of
prices unaffected: 'though a rise of wages in a given trade may be
compensated to the masters by a rise of the price of their commodity, a
rise of general wages cannot be compensated to employers generally by
a general rise of prices' (pp. 600-1; cf. p. 661). 38
But the partial case was ~he only one of practical significance. There
a rise would be 'a gain made, wholly or in part, at the expense of the
38
'A rise of wages, thus confined to particular employments, is not (like a rise of
general wages) defrayed from profits, but raises the value and price of the particular
article, and falls on the consumer' (Principles, CW, iii. 930).
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remainder of the labouring classes'. Consequently, for Mill unionization entailed a 'serious question of right and wrong, as between
Unionists and the remainder of the labouring classes' (p. 662). While
labourers had 'no obligations but those of prudence' towards their
employers, who at any rate were 'quite capable of taking care of
themselves', they did 'owe moral duties to the remainder of the
labouring classes' and 'to the community at large'. This is precisely
Jevons's position. To this Mill added the censure that Jevons later
raised: unions created inefficiencies by resisting technological innovations (p. 665).
Restrictive trade unions were, however, justified in the face of
overwhelming population growth on the part of unskilled workers:
if the present state of the general habits of the people were to remain for ever
unimproved, these partial combinations, in so far as they do succeed in keeping
up the wages of any trade by limiting its numbers might be looked upon as
simply intrenching round a particular spot against the inroads of overpopulation, and making their wages depend upon their own rate of increase, instead
of depending on that of a more reckless and improvident class than themselves
(CW, ii. 397). 39

Further, the attainment of high general wages should 'be welcomed
and rejoiced at' (CW, iii. 929; cf. p. 930). Most importantly, 'the right of
making the attempt' to raise wages was a matter of justice, and n'6t to
be denied. In short, 'the improvement and elevation of the working
classes' through 'the liberty of association' was championed (p. 903).
Like Jevons, however, Mill insisted that unions be voluntary.
Yet Mill favoured an alternative to capitalism, which would properly reward personal initiative, encourage the achievement of independence by labourers, and reduce class conflict (CW, ii. 207). 40
Co-operation, the ownership of enterprises with labourers working
under managers 'elected and removable by themselves', was said to put
an end to the dependence of labourers, making them 'in some sort, a
partner' in the enterprise (CW, iv. 382). Mill anticipated efficiency
advantages of co-operation, since workers would gain a direct interest
in the productive process, creating a 'vast stimulous to productive
energies' (CW, iii. 792). And like Jevons, Mill argued that co-operation
39

Mill however, foresaw a time when, population growth having declined, this
restriction would no longer be necessary. Once he perceived a lessening of the pressure
of population growth, he became more reluctant to endorse the union's restriction of
labour supply. See the account in Hollander, The Economics of Mill, pp. 897f. For
evidence that Jevons shared these concerns, see below.
40
Mill wanted equal opportunities, and reward according to initiative; he objected to
the division of the produce only slightly connected 'with merit and demerit, or even with
exertion and want of exertion in the individual' (Essays on Economics, CW, v. 444; cf.
Principles, CW, iii. 769). But see P. Schwartz, The New Political Economy of J. S. Mill,
London, 1972, p. 197.
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offered due reward for abilities and exertions, and yet promised the end
of the clash of interests between employers and employed (p. 768; cf.
CW, iv. 382).
Mill insisted that co-operative ventures be voluntary and practicable. In 1848 and,1849, when partnership laws made true co-operation
difficult to attain, he focused on profit-sharing and partnership as
practical means of reform, 'obtaining the benefits of co-operation,
without constituting the numerical majority of the co-operators an
inferior caste' (CW, iii. 1013; cf. p. 1007; iv. 385-6). These were second
best, however, to true co-operation which would, in contrast to
Jevons's recommendation, entirely (not 'in som~ degree'), efface the
capital-labour distinction. There is, then, some merit to White's evaluation if we understand his claim to signifiy that Jevons was less radical
than Mill. 41

Jevons's analysis of taxation added the explicit theoretical notion of
diminishing marginal utility to Mill's analysis of this issue>- For while
Mill allowed that proportionate taxation imposed a burden on the poor
'incommensurable' with that of the rich, this was envisaged as a
contrast between the very poor and the rest of the population (CW, iii.
809). In his mind the key distinction was between incomes that enabled
the consumption of only necessaries-the taxation of which imposed
an unjustifiably large burden-and incomes that yielded a surplus
spent on luxuries. The distinction between 'comforts' and 'luxuries'
was not granted (cf. CW, xv. 976). There is, however, evidence that Mill
favoured redistributive policies based on a version of the principle of
diminishing marginal utility. 42
It must be recalled, too, that for Jevons diminishing marginal utility
considerations were overruled by classical concerns as an argument
for progression. Mill shared these concerns; on humanitarian grounds
he called for exemption of a minimum income (CW, iii. 831), and argued
that taxing high (earned) incomes progressively would punish initiative and create incentives problems (p. 810). 43 He also allowed that
unearned income might be taxed progressively, with no adverse incentives effects (pp. 819-20), a point which Jevons did not address.

41
See above, note 6. Mill went beyond Jevons also in recommending compensation for
losses incurred due to intervention. For evidence that the utility principle entailed some
right to compensation, see Principles, CW, ii. 233.
2
'
See Principles, CW, ii. 225-6, and Hollander, The Economics of Mill, pp. 880-1. This is
further evidence that Mill went beyond Jevons.
3
'
Income was to be taxed 'only in proportion to the surplus by which they exceed the
limit' -allowing some amount of progression (Principles, CW, iii. 831).
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VI
I have demarcated a remarkable similarity between the policy analyses
of Mill and Jevons. My final task now is to ascertain whether Jevons
appreciated and acknowledged this near identity with Mill.
Jevons's earliest remarks concerning Mill's theory of public policy
reveal a deep appreciation for Mill's notion of liberty. In 1866 he wrote,
'For my part I wish to see cherished and developed in England such
liberalism as Mr. Mill has deliberately described in his brief but great
essay on liberty" (to the Manchester Examiner and Times, 22 Oct.
Papers and Correspondence, iii. 132). His lecture delivered at Owens
College the same year, on 'The Importance of Diffusing a Knowledge of
Political Economy', reiterated that
By liberty I do nQt mean merely what is vulgarly regarded as liberty by many,
the privilege to vote for a representative in Parliament. I mean what Mr. Mill
upholds as true liberty, in that noble essay which is perhaps the best of his
great works (ibid., vii. 42).

Jevons also recognized Mill's precedence regarding the criteria for
the provision of public services. In the 1875 Lectures this is said to
involve in each case 'Mill's result', a comparison of relative public and
private advantages. Jevons reiterated Mill's distinction between
'necessary and optional' functions of government, the latter being
provided when 'the public utility of these things is exceedingly obvious
and when it is plain that they can be more cheaply and effectively done
by a single agency'. In short,
The truth on this subject I should say is that there is no general principle,
except that of adding up the comparative advantages in each particular case,
ie. you must make the best observation you can of the results of experiments
one way or the other.
The Manchester Omnibus Company ought to be in the hands of the local
government.
What I have stated is Mill's result (ibid., vi. 133).

In 1882 Jevons cited Mill's remarks from the Principles in a passage
which is enlightening, since it reveals agreement with Mill's recommendations that labourers recognize their common interests, and also
a common concern about the population issue:
J. S. Mill, after expressing some opinions in which I cannot coincide, has added
the following striking passage, which cannot be too much read:- ' ... partial
combinations ... might be looked upon as simply intrenching round a particular spot against the inroads of overpopulation, and making their wages depend
upon their own rate of increase, instead of depending on that of a more reckless
and improvident class than themselves. The time, however, is past when the
friends of human improvement can look with complacency on the attempts of
small sections of the community, whether belonging to the labouring or any
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other class, to organize a separate class interest in antagonism to the general
body of labourers' (SRL, pp. 108-9).44

Throughout his career Jevons relied on Mill's authority in the
disc:µssion of co-operation. In the 1866 plea for partnership Jevons
added his 'small voice to that of men like Mr. Mill' (Papers and
Correspondence, iii. 138). An 1867 letter published in The Times suggested that co-operation was 'neither in principle nor in practice'
'really new', since 'J. S. Mill, in advocating [it] many years ago, ...
pointed out many instances where labourers share results' (p. 153). The
1870 lecture 'On Industrial Partnerships', referred to passages in Mill's
Principles on co-operation. And in 1882 Jevons acknowledged again
that 'the outlines of the scheme are familiar to all who have read with
proper care John Stuart Mill's Principles of Political Economy' (SRL, p.
143).
At the same time, Jevons was highly critical of Utilitarianism; in the
1879 review he argued that Mill had 'left the grounds of Paley and
Bentham' and 'thrown ethical philosophy into confusion'. The primary
objection was that while pleasures differed qualitatively as Mill
maintained, Mill had not arrived at the means of ranking pleasures. 45
His notion of 'competent judges' was akin to 'a packed jury', whose
ranking would amount to the 'verdict which would be given by
vegetarians in favour of a vegetable diet'. Jevons concluded that
'Mcill's attempt to reconcile his ideas on the subject with the Utilitarian theory hopelessly fails' (pp. 532-3).
The trouble is that Jevons himself failed to resolve the problems
associated with ranking pleasures. It is the case that policy analysis,
for Jevons (and this is also true of Mill), entailed inevitable subjective
value judgments concerning the nature of the 'pleasures' associated
with particular policies. 46 A Free Library is a worthwhile policy
because it leads to responsible educated behaviour which is judged to
be a 'better' outcome than the Race Track result of short term pleasure
with few educational benefits. Mill and Jevons agreed in their policy
recommendations because they happened to share similar visions of a
reformed society-whose citizens were intellectually as well as
economically independent-and thus broadly speaking in their evaluation of 'pleasures'.
Jevons did not specify the 'opinions' of Mill he contested.
'Mill's Philosophy Tested', pp. 523, 525. Jevons argued in opposition to Mill, that the
Library was a better policy than the race track, 'not because there is a "Free-Library
building emotion", which is essentially, better than a "Race-Course-establishing emotion"', but because, having analyzed the effects of each policy in terms of the types of
pleasure created, the policy maker finds that the Library creates the most pleasure.
46
See Robbins for the argument that all recommendations of policy entail 'judgments
of value' and 'conventions' which facilitate interpersonal comparability ('Economics and
Political Economy', Papers and Proceedings of the AEA, lxxi (1981), 5, 6).
«
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At the same time, I have pointed to significant differences between
Jevons and Mill. First, Jevons failed to consider the possibility of
compensating those harmed by government policies. This may be a
reflection of a more pervasive difference: Jevons was in some instances
less willing than Mill to call for intervention. He objected to Mill's
calls for wide-ranging land reform in Ireland, and maintained a less
radical stance on co-operation than Mill.

VII
I turn in conclusion to an evaluation of the relationship between
Jevons's Theory of Political Economy and his analysis
,. of economic
policy. This issue is important considering on-going debate concerning
the relevance of Jevons's utility theory to his policy analysis. R. D. C.
Black has suggested that Jevons placed little faith in economic theory
as a guide to policy analysis. Similarly, Mark Blaug has argued that
'when Jevons and Walras wrote on policy questions, as they did, there
wa& little or no connection between practical recommendations and
their views on value theory'. 47 Yet, as noted at the outset, T. W.
Hutchison contends that the policy and theory 're- or evolutions' were
related.
We have seen that the case of progressive taxation based on the
marginal utility theory, was not decisive for Jevons. Based on his
methodological position outlined above, he rejected exclusive reliance
upon static economic theory. Taxation, like all policy issues, required
consideration of not only static but also dynamic and social 'probabilities'. Thus proportionate taxation, though not recommended from a
marginal utility perspective, might still be the preferred tax rule on the
(classical) theoretical grounds that it reinforced incentives to save,
and on the social grounds that it served to inculcate responsible
working class behaviour. More generally, as argued above, prices were
not sufficient to measure the utilitarian (social) value of any good, or
policy measure, since 'moral', 'sanitary' and other considerations were
also entailed. I have demonstrated the close continuity in the policy
analysis of Mill and Jevons; and attributed that continuity to a basic
conception of social utility which allowed only a limited role for
marginal utility and prices.
What of Hutchison's claim that marginal utility theory precipitated
a new interest in the issues of poverty, and unemployment? There is no
evidence of a 'new' interest in the issues of poverty or unemployment in
Jevons's works. Unemployment was simply not a policy concern for
See Black's remarks in 'William Stanley Jevons 183&-1882', Pioneers of Modern
Economics, ed. D. P. O'Brien and J. R. Presley, London, 1981, p. 24, and also Blaug, p. 269.
47
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Jevons. And my investigation has revealed that his concern with the
poverty of the labouring classes was in line with that of Mill.
It is equally clear that Hutchison's evaluation does not do justice to
the caution and empiricism of Mill, who did not rely upon 'rigid,
Ricardian deduc~ive absolutism', and whose approach to policy questions was so similar to that of Jevons. For both policy analysis was at
best an imprecise 'art' requiring that issues of policy be decided on the
basis of experiential knowledge. 48
It is important to reiterate here that Jevons in one respect went
somewhat beyond Mill in the matter of experimental legislation. For
while Mill urged that voluntary social and economic experiments be
'encouraged', he did not recommend experimental legislation. This is
an original contribution by Jevons; yet there is nothing in Mill's
analysis to suggest that he would have opposed Jevons's recommendations that legislation proceed tentatively and allow diversity and the
utmost possible local control. In the light of Mill's own strong commitment to local diversity, one might presume that he would favour the
1880 recommendations.
My demonstration of the parallels between Mill and Jevons in the
design of utilitarian presumptive rules, as well as in specific policy
recommendations dictated by a shared concern for the working classes,
suggests that Mill, also, was instrumental in the trend in favour of
intervention evident in nineteenth-century policy analysis, a fact
which the secondary literature has apparently failed to appreciate. 49
Indeed the evidence from his later works suggests that Jevons may
have been more cautious, and more inclined to favour individual
initiative (as opposed to government agency) than Mill. And in the
analysis of co-operation, J evons did not proceed as far as Mill.
Whether a 'transition', a movement towards intervention, occurred
in Jevons's own thought is a much debated issue. T. W. Hutchison
concedes that no one of Jevons's works provides conclusive evidence of
a transition, but in a recent evaluation he contrasts Jevons's early
(Australian) work with SRL and concludes that 1870 marks a personal
'turning point' for Jevons. 50 Yet there are many instances of continuity
in Jevons's thought. It may be helpful to review these instances, which
apply to Jevons's position concerning not only particular issues, but
Indeed, Paul has minimized Jevons's contribution by suggesting that he 'endorsed
Mill's fondness for attempting social experiments on a small scale' (p. 278).
•• There are, however, some exceptions. See, for instance, Schwartz, as well as
Hollander, The Economics of Mill.
60 See Hutchison's position in On Revolutions, p. 97. R. Backhouse reiterates this, as
well as many of Hutchison's arguments concerning the (post 1870) changing attitudes of
economists towards state intervention and poverty (A History of Modern Economic
Analysis, Oxford, 1985, pp. 75, 241--B). Hutch,ison concludes that 1870 marks a turning
point in 'The Politics and Philosophy', p. 376.
48
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also the principles of public policy. He reiterated his 1867 views
regarding the basis for government intervention in 1880 and 1882. In
1871, 1880 and 1882 he cautioned that government reforms must take
into account the state of popular opinion. In 1863, 1870 and 1878 Jevons
insisted that poverty and vice must be alleviated. He upheld the
principle of individual liberty from 1866 on. And he retained his 1868
view regarding trade unions and co-operation through 1882.51
Further, the evidence from two works written very late in Jevons's
career, reveal a presumption against intervention. Thus while he
called for specific innovative interventions (new programmes which
were feasible only once the education question was 'cleared up'), these
at the same time entailed little direct government action, and Jevons
retained a presumption in favour of competition, markets, and noninterference with (orderly) social progress.
There is a further relevant matter if we are to maintain an accurate
perspective. While Mill and Jevons appreciated the need for intervention to help the labouring classes, both retained a firm commitment to
'self-reliance'. And both believed that policy should be used to create
self-reliant citizens. Intervention might be required if self-reliant
action failed to achieve just results, but the long-term aim of policy
was the eventual achievement of independent and responsible behaviour by workers, behaviour which under existing social and economic relations was not forthcoming. Thus for both, the utilitarian
objective encompassed not only purely economic but also social and
ethical goals-the encouragement of the virtue of self-reliance.

Since he did not write about taxation after 1875, it is difficult to determine whether
Jevons continued to maintain his position on taxation or not.
'
51

